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Microfinance targets the poor and very poor, both in urban and rural areas. It has become 
a common method of poverty alleviation in many developing countries. Several 
microfinance institutions have adopted a social mission to eradicate poverty by providing 
credit to the poor.  In the past, microfinance organizations used to focus on farmers in 
rural areas.  Modern microfinance programs are focused on the population that is largely 
neglected by the formal financial sector, specifically women. Due to the perceived risk in 
this type of uncollateralized lending, private equity markets are not keen on financing 
microfinance institutions. Furthermore, microfinance institutions are seen as socially 
motivated as opposed to being financially motivated. For that reason, their profitability 
and sustainability has come under question in the last decade.  
Two approaches to the issue of sustainability exist. The dominant institutionist approach 
argues that microfinance institutions should focus on being sustainable as this will 
improve their chances of alleviating poverty. The welfarist approach disagrees with this 
view by arguing that focusing on sustainability will result in the neglect of the poorest of 
the poor. 
This study analyses the sustainability of microfinance in South Africa by using a case study 
research approach. The study explores the challenges to sustainability in South Africa. The 
results of the study indicate that the microfinance institutions are not profitable nor self- 
sufficient. The most notable challenge to this sustainability is the high personnel costs. 
South African MFIs experience higher operating costs than their African counterparts. The 
study also indicates that the more financially sound microfinance institutions have a lower 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The existence of microfinance finance institutions today is largely attributed to the 
pioneering work of Mohamed Yunus who is the founder of the globally replicated 
Grameen Bank (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008).  The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh 
provided credit to women in the rural areas in the 1970s (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008; 
Battilana and Dorado, 2010). The concept of credit provision to the rural population can 
be traced back to 19th century Europe when microcredit organizations provided credit to 
rural farmers and the poor (Hollis and Sweetman, 1998).  
Microfinance targets the poor and very poor, both in urban and rural areas. It has become 
a common method of poverty eradication in many developing countries (Hollis and 
Sweetman, 1998; Gibbons and Meehan, 2002). 
Several microfinance institutions (MFIs) have adopted a social mission to eradicate 
poverty by providing credit to the poor (Goldberg, 2005; Gibson and Meehan, 2002).  
Although microfinance organizations in the past used to focus on farmers in rural areas 
(Hollis and Sweetman, 1998), modern MFIs programs are focused on the population that 
is largely neglected by the formal financial sector, specifically women in rural areas 
(Goldberg, 2005).  
Historically, MFIs have relied on subsidies in order to meet their mission of poverty 
eradication (Morduch, 2000). There is an ongoing debate within the microfinance 
literature regarding the dependence of microfinance institutions on subsidies and grants. 
The debate is between welfarists who argue that an MFI’s main focus should be the 
eradication of poverty on a large scale. Welfarists argue that institutions that focus on 
sustainability end up providing loans to the less poor and not the poorest of the poor 
(Morduch, 2000; Robinson, 1995). This argument is based on the premise that institutions 
that do not rely on subsidies have to ultimately transfer the costs of their sustainability to 
their clients. Therefore, the inherent cost of an institution’s sustainability can be afforded 
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by the poor but not the very poor (Morduch, 2000, Robinson, 1995). On the opposite end, 
institutionists argue that institutional sustainability is a necessary condition for 
institutions to be sustainable (Morduch, 2000, Woller and Dunford, 1999; Gibbons and 
Meehan, 2002).  
1.2. Research problem 
 
The contemporary issue in microfinance literature is whether MFIs should continue their 
dependency on subsidies because they have a social mission. The alternative is to wean 
off subsidies in order to achieve institutional sustainability and higher outreach. Some 
studies conclude that non-subsidized MFIs tend to last longer and serve more borrowers 
than subsidized MFIs (Sweetman and Hollis, 1998).  Other studies conclude that there is 
no trade-off between sustainability and outreach (Kereta, 2007). In other words, 
microfinance institutions can be sustainable without compromising their ability to serve 
more clients. However other studies conclude that there is a trade-off between 
sustainability and outreach (Cull et al., 2006).  
The debate still continues as some MFIs in developing countries have experienced no 
trade-off between sustainability and outreach while others have. There are limited 
studies on the issue of sustainability in Africa; one was conducted in Ethiopia (Kereta, 
2007) and one in Uganda (Okumu, 2007).  
The literature states that there is positive correlation between outreach and subsidy 
dependence. An MFI’s ability to serve the poorest of the poor is likely to be compromised 
when an MFI focuses on being sustainable (Buckley, 1997; Morduch 2000). The study 
expects to find a higher depth of outreach in institutions that are less operationally 
sustainable and profitable. These types of MFIs lean towards the debated “welfarist” 
school of thought which prioritizes reaching the poor over sustainability. Similarly the 
study expects to find a higher breadth of outreach in and lower depth of outreach in 
institutions that are more operationally sustainable and profitable; the “institutionist” 
school of thought. 
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1.3. Rationale and purpose of study  
 
In South African, a number of government organizations such as the Small Enterprise 
Development Agency (SEDA) and NGOs such as the Women’s Development Bank have 
been formed specifically to address the issue of limited access of microfinance to rural 
areas. It is therefore important that MFI’s institutional makeup be subject to study. This 
will allow them to improve where necessary. It will also provide insight regarding the 
challenges MFIs face and also contribute towards policy formulation. South African MFI 
sustainability ability to provide access to the poor and very poor, also known as outreach, 
have received little academic attention.  
1.4. Objectives of the study  
 
The main objective is:  
 To establish whether South African MFIs are institutionally sustainable. 
The subsidiary objective is: 
 To identify the constraints to operational and financial sustainability and; 
 To find out whether or not MFI’s in SA have sound corporate governance. 
1.5. Delimitations and Assumptions 
 
The following section discusses the delimitations and assumptions of the study. 
1.5.1. Limitations 
 
The following limitations apply to the study:  
 The study is limited to formal microfinance institutions and will therefore not 
focus on the informal microfinance lending companies like loan “sharks” and small 
loan businesses.  





The research study is based on the assumption that: 
 Formal microfinance institutions in South Africa maintain audited financial records 
and; 
 Microfinance institution managers are interested in knowing whether their 
institutions are sustainable or not.  Therefore, microfinance institutions will co-
operate in the provision of audited financial records for data collection purposes.  
1.6. Overview 
 
This study consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the sustainability 
of microfinance. The chapter also provides the study’s theoretical framework. 
Chapter 3 discusses the research design and methodology. It details the research 
instruments used, the data collection method and data analysis.  
Chapter 4 presents the results of the sustainability measures. The results of the 
sustainability measures are compared to the international benchmarks. It also provides 
insight into the why the results are observed, based on the theoretical framework. 
Chapter 5 provides a summary and conclusion of the study. It also states the research’s 





CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW  
The review of existing microfinance literature provides the theoretical framework that 
serves as a platform for this study. Section 2.1 of this review will briefly discuss the origins 
of microfinance as a tool for poverty alleviation. Section 2.2 discusses sustainability and 
what it means in the context of microfinance. In addition, the section reviews the hotly 
debated schools of thought regarding the sustainability of microfinance institutions. This 
debate forms the basis of this study’s enquiry. Section 2.3 discusses the challenges that 
MFIs face in their quest for sustainability and Section 2.6 concludes.   
2.1. Introduction 
 
Ledgerwood (1999) states that “microfinance arose in the 1980s as a response to doubts 
and research findings about state delivery of subsidized credit to poor farmers.”  In the 
1970s government agencies were the predominant method of providing productive credit 
to those without access to credit facilities.”  
Much of the current literature credits the growth of microfinance to the founder of the 
Grameen Bank which was established in 1976 in Bangladesh; Professor Mohammed 
Yunus (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). The Grameen Bank model has since been 
replicated in various developing countries.   
2.2. Microfinance Institution Sustainability  
 
Most microfinance institutions operate outside the formal financial sector which is mostly 
equity funded. As a result, most MFIs are funded through grants and subsidies.  A large 
majority of MFIs have been argued to be unsustainable.  When sustainable, MFIs 
compromise their ability to provide finance to the very poor (Woller et al., 1999; 
Morduch, 2000) 
The use of the term sustainability by those who are against subsidy dependence 
(Institutionists) and those who encourage subsidy dependence (Welfarists) appears not 
to have a fixed meaning. The term is used interchangeably with terms such as financial 
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self-sufficiency, profitability and financial viability (Buss, 1999; Ledgerwood 1999; 
Schreiner 2000, Woller and Schreiner, 2006).  
Ledgerwood (1999) refers to self-sufficiency instead of sustainability and the focus is not 
on equity as in Buss’ (1999) definition but more on operations. Ledgerwood (1999: 217) 
provides the following definition:  “financial self-sufficiency indicates whether or not 
enough revenue has been earned to cover both direct costs. These costs include financing 
costs, provisions for loans losses, and operating expenses, and indirect costs, including 
the adjusted cost of capital.”  
Schreiner (2000:3) provides the following definition: “sustainable microfinance 
organizations meet their goals now without harming their ability to meet their goals 
later.” Schreiner’s (2000) definition leans more towards Ledgerwood’s (1999) emphasis 
on operations but it also emphasizes perpetuity of the organization.  
Woller and Schreiner (2002; 2) state that in microfinance “program sustainability has 
become more or less synonymous with financial self-sufficiency. Financial self-sufficiency 
is the non-profit equivalent of profitability.”   These variations in focus indicate the point 
of diversion between the two schools of thought.  
For the purpose of this study, the sustainability of MFIs shall mean “whether or not 
enough revenue has been earned to cover both direct costs. These costs include financing 
costs, provisions for loans losses, and operating expenses, and indirect costs, including 
the adjusted cost of capital (Ledgerwood, 1999).”  
There are two predominant views regarding the sustainability of MFIs. The first view is 
that of “welfarists” who state that MFIS should not focus on sustainability. However, the 
focus should be on outreach and poverty alleviation as this is the mission of a majority, if 
not all MFIs. The “institutionists” on the other hand argue that MFIs should endeavor to 
be sustainable and self-sufficient while still addressing the mission of poverty alleviation 
as the main focus.  (Woller et al., 1999, Morduch, 2000).  
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2.2.1. Welfarists – Pro Subsidy 
 
The following section reviews the opposing arguments of inistitutionists and welfarists 
regarding the sustainability of MFIs.  
Welfarists place greater emphasis on an MFI’s ability to provide financing to the poor and 
the poorest of the poor in larger numbers. Although they are not averse to the idea of 
self-sufficient and sustainable MFIs, welfarists are of the opinion that the attainment of 
sustainability would be at the expense of the outreach to the poorest of the poor 
(Morduch, 2000). Based on an analysis conducted on 72 MFIs, Conning (1999) argues that 
extending credit to the poorest of the poor bears higher costs than extending credit to 
other segments of the market. More significantly, private capital or leverage may be much 
harder to achieve for MFIs that target the poorest of the poor.  Conning’s (1999) 
conclusion suggests that MFIs that do not rely on subsidies might in fact not 
accommodate the very poor and only focus on the near poor as argued by welfarists 
Welfarists also argue that MFIs can be sustainable without being financially self-sufficient. 
To support this argument, welfarists state the subsidies or donations are a form of equity, 
therefor MFIs can be sustainable without being financially self-sustainable (Morduch, 
2000).  In contrast, institutionists argue that financial self-sufficiency is a necessary 
condition for sustainability and the welfarists’ view that subsidies can sustain MFIs is 
wrongly skewed (Robinson, 1995; Morduch, 2000; Woller et al., 1999).  
 
2.2.2.  Institutionists – Anti Subsidy 
 
Contrary to the welfarist argument of a value based approached to poverty alleviation; 
institutionists argue that in order to have a sizeable impact on poverty alleviation, large 
financial intermediaries have to be at the forefront (Woller et al., 1999).  
The funds from donors cannot be expected to flow indefinitely. Therefore MFIs have to 
consider sourcing private capital at some point. In order to do that, MFIs have to prove to 
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be self-sufficient in order to attract capital (Woller et al., 1999; Morduch, 2000; Robinson 
1995; Gibbons and Meehan, 2000).  
Hollis and Sweetman (1998) studied six European microfinance organizations in the 18th 
century. They investigated the institutional designs that facilitated success and 
sustainability. They concluded that subsidized loan funds were more fragile and lost focus 
more quickly than those that obtained funds from depositors.   
Institutionists have designed and propagated a set of “best practices” which should be 
adopted by industry to encourage institutional self-sufficiency (Woller et al., 1999; 
Gibbons and Meehan, 2000). Best practices are practices that improve institutional 
efficiency and effectiveness in areas such as (Woller, et al., 1999): 
 management; 
 management systems,  
 finance and accounting and; 
 product design.  
Ledgerwood (1999:4) states that sound microfinance activities based on best practices 
play a decisive role in providing financial services to the poor through sustainable 
institutions. However, best practices are not regular practice for many MFIs. Best 
practices prescribe a situation where MFIs achieve sustainability while serving the poorest 
of the poor. In microfinance literature, this situation is referred to as the win-win 
situation.   
This win-win proposition is based on the logic that MFIs that assume a financial 
intermediary role and are not dependent on subsidies are able to grow without the 
financial limitations of subsidy budgets.  Therefore, such institutions can increase their 
outreach to the poor more than they can under donor funding.  The key basis of this 
proposition is that the poor demand credit and not necessarily cheap credit. This is 
significant because it implies that the poor can afford credit if it is appropriately priced. 
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Table 1 summarizes recent empirical evidence that supports both arguments. Cull et al. 
(2007), Gutiemez-Neito et al. (2009) and Hermes et al. (2011) found a trade-off between 
sustainability and outreach. These results mean that there is not a situation where an 
institution can be sustainable while reaching the poorest of the poor. On the other hand, 
Mersland and Strom (2010) and Quayes (2012) found no trade-off between sustainability 
and outreach. The results of these studies mean that there is a situation where 
sustainability and outreach to the poor can be achieved. Therefore, there is no consensus 
that the adoption of best practices will ensure financial sustainability and an increase in 
outreach.  
Table 1: Summary of empirical research on the trade-off between social and financial 
performance  
Source: Louis et al. 2013 
Publication Methodology Data source Outreach var. Fin. efficiency var. Conclusion
Cull et al. (2007): Financial
performance and outreach: a
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Morduch (2000) critiques the arguments that support the win-win proposition that forms 
the basis of the institutionist argument.  The summary of Morduch’s (2000) critique is that 
the argument relies on empirical assumptions that cannot be easily generalized. Morduch 
(2000) further states that most empirical studies on best practices do not provide 
comparable attributes on factors that ensure best-practice.   
 
In acknowledgement of the predominant institutionist view (Morduch, 2000), it is 
essential to raise the question; what are the challenges that MFIs face in achieving 
sustainability without compromising outreach?   
2.3. Challenges to MFI Sustainability 
 
The following section reviews the challenges faced by MFI as identified by the literature.  
Ledgerwood (1999:4) highlights the many challenges that MFIs face. The list below 
highlights some of the issues:  
 Many MFIs never reach either the minimal scale or the efficiency necessary to 
cover costs.  
 Initial capital is often in the form of subsidy or grant due to the lack of private 
capital. 
 Some MFIs target a segment of the population that has no access to business 
opportunities because of lack of markets, inputs and demand.  
 Some MFIs mismanage their funds and fail to meet future cash needs and, 
consequently face liquidity problems.  
 Some MFIs do not develop the financial systems or skills required.  
2.3.1. Limited Access to Capital   
 
Muller and Udhe (2008) state that competition for funding has increased due to the 
increased number of MFIs. As a result, the profitability of MFIs has become important for 
all MFIs, even those that operate as non-profit organizations. 
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Non-Profit Organizations are the most common entity choice for MFIs (Ledgerwood, 
1999).  According to Chu and Otero (2002), a majority of funding used by NGOs is often 
in the form of grants and concessionary loans. These statements illustrate the context of 
many MFIs by implying that at least six out of ten MFIs are likely to be NGOs and likely to 
be financed by grants and concessionary loans.  
The effect of the source of funds on sustainability has polarized views in the literature. 
For instance, Buckley (1997) argues there is a positive correlation between outreach and 
donor funding. This is in the context of outreach being dependent on sustainability. In 
other words, outreach is in most case possible when the institution is sustainable. On the 
opposing end, Rhyne and Otero (1992) argue that outreach can be achieved through 
commercial loans and savings mobilization.  
2.3.2. Governance  
 
Another key component of the MFI sustainability debate is the internal governance of 
microfinance institutions. Harstaska (2004), stresses the importance of governance on 
performance while Hartarska and Mersland, (2012) argue that the use of accounting 
ratios alone is an insufficient measure of sustainability. Governance is a key component 
because an MFI’s management and board are the ones tasked with achieving 
sustainability. (Lapenu and Pierret, 2006; Labie, 2000; Ledgerwood, 2000). 
Therefore, MFI governance is reviewed within the context of sustainability. Questions 
such as; what is typical MFI governance, is there a trend towards sustainability driven 
governance and what are good governance factors,  need to be addressed.  
What is governance? In microfinance literature, governance refers to “the relationship 
between the board of directors and the management of the MFI (Lapenu and Pierre: 10, 
2006).” Lapenu and Pierret, (2006) state that “good functioning” of the board is not 
sufficient to ensure a sustainable MFI, and that all other stakeholders must be considered 
in the definition of governance. 
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The presence of effective corporate governance can steer an MFI in the direction of 
achieving financial sustainability through strategic decision making (Rock et al., 1998). An 
institution that has governance with a strong strategic focus is also better suited to deal 
with mission drift (Lapenu and Pierret, 2006). Rock et al. (1998) argue that aligning the 
interests of the directors with the interests of the institution is the key to strategic 
decision making.    
Empirical, country specific studies indicate that internal governance in MFIs is a key factor 
to financial and social success (Muller and Udhe, 2008). These studies identify the 
following key success factors of internal corporate governance for strengthening MFI 
performance (Muller and Udhe, 2008): constitution, experience, remuneration, board 
independence and establishment of board oversight (Rock et al., 1998; Labie, 2000).  
On the contrary, a study by Mersland and Strom (2007) found no empirical evidence that 
indicates that strong corporate governance in formal banks has an impact on the financial 
success of microfinance institutions.  
Lapenu and Pierret (2006; 30) propose that institutions should be able to make sure that 
the foundation for good governance is in place. This foundation is made up of six 
fundamental elements: 
• A shared strategic vision; 
• A reliable and quick management information system to make decisions 
and aid monitoring; 
• Decision-making processes that are clear, well-adapted and coherent with 
the governance structure; 
• A level of staff training, capacity and involvement that ensures decisions 
are executed; 
• An efficient monitoring system, and; 
• Ability to prevent and overcome internal and external crises. 
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Labie (2000) supports this view by stating that the first step to good governance is to 
improve the control relationship between an MFI’s board and its management. 
 2.3.3. Board Efficiency and Performance 
 
A study on how managerial compensation, board independence, and auditing affect 
performance revealed that not all known governance mechanisms affect performance 
(Harstaska 2004). The study found that some traditional control mechanisms such as 
performance compensation are ineffective while mechanisms like board independence 
affect performance positively (Hartaska and Mersland, 2012; Hartarska, 2004).  
Hartaska and Mersland’s (2012) study estimated a stochastic cost frontier to measure the 
cost minimization goal of an MFI and to also measure output. The aim of the study was 
to identify mechanisms that promote governance in rated MFIs.  The study reveals that: 
 the joint role of CEO and Chairman of a board reduces efficiency (Mersland and 
Strom, 2007); 
 managerial efficiency increases with boards that have up to nine members and 
less, and;  
 the presence of donors in a board is less beneficial than the presence of 
creditors/clients on the board. 
Mersland and Strom (2007) use a sample of rated MFIs to study the effect of corporate 
governance in MFIs. Their study found that ownership type of an MFI does not affect the 
productively. In other words, Non-profit MFIs or commercial MFIs can both have boards 
that affect performance positively or negatively.  
Barry and Tacneng (2011) analyzed the effects of MFI organizational structure and 
external governance on its performance. The study used a panel of 281 MFIs in Africa 
from 1996 -2008 and found that the different institution types have varying financial and 
operational performance. More prominently, the study suggests that NGOs are the 
entities most likely to achieve the social goal of increasing outreach. However, these 
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institutions are less likely to achieve outreach while simultaneously achieving 
sustainability. Furthermore, external governance (regulation) is found to increase 
efficiency and productivity of MFIs without improving its portfolio quality.  
Campion (1998) conducted a survey of 42 MFIs in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. 
The focus of the survey was to identify the main issues related to the governance of MFIs. 
The survey also aimed to define effective governance practices in MFIs and subsequently 
develop guidelines for effective governance of MFIs. The survey revealed that an MFI’s 
institutional structure has a limited role in determining the governance practices. In other 
words NGOs, For-profit MFIs, government institutions, and cooperatives tend to have 
similar governance practices.  
In a study of 202 MFIs from 2001-2006, Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) investigated the 
relationship between MFI type (legal status) and performance. The study revealed that 
there is a significant difference in financial performance, efficiency, size, solvency and 
portfolio quality dependent on the legal status of the MFIs. The study does not indicate 
any difference in profitability between NGOs and private MFIs. However, there is a 
difference in sustainability, with private MFIs being more sustainable than NGOs. The 
study further finds no difference in efficiency between NGOs and private companies. This 
seems contradictory because efficiency (cost reduction) is necessary for MFI 
sustainability. The author states that it is only when portfolio quality is used as an 
indicator for performance that private entities outperform NGOs.  
Campion’s (1998) survey highlighted that the there is an alignment of interests between 
management and board. This observation challenges the agency problem that is often 
faced in corporate governance where there is a misalignment of goals between 
management and board. In corporate governance the agency problem is combated by 




2.3.5. Human Capital Efficiency 
 
Whether they receive subsidies or not, MFIs charge high interest rates in order to cover 
their costs (D’Espallier et al., 2011). MFIs mainly incur four types of costs, these include 
financing costs, provisions for loan losses, operational costs, and adjusted costs of capital 
(Ledgerwood, 2000). This raises the question as to whether the reduction of some of 
these costs might help reduce a portion of the administration costs and therefore increase 
in net profits. Hudon and Traca (2011) argue that subsidies have a positive impact on 
efficiency. However, after a certain threshold subsidies tend to make the institution less 
efficient.  
Bhutt and Tang (2001) cited in Hudon and Traca (2011:968) argue that subsides to 
microfinance NGOs tend to end up funding inefficiency and poor management practices. 
This supports Morduch’s (2000) argument that subsidies somewhat take away the 
responsibility of efficiency from management because several donors continue to fund 
poor performing MFIs as opposed to “punishing” them. The ultimate effect of this 
inefficiency is continued subsidy dependence and unsustainability.  
In the same breath, subsidies also allow MFIs to invest in human and infrastructure 
efficiency (Hudson and Traca, 2011). Therefore the subsidies can indirectly improve 
efficiency, but only up to a certain threshold. This threshold could ideally be the point 
where the MFI moves towards sustainability and the donor gradually reduces the subsidy 
to zero.  
In Africa, one of the most significant constraints to sustainability and growth is the scarcity 
of skilled manpower. Senior MFI managers reportedly lack vision and managerial capacity 
to create efficiencies (Ashcroft, 2008). Furthermore, the corporate governance is 
reportedly poor in a number of MFIs across Africa. Ashcraft (2008) argues that the 
poaching of staff, insufficient training and rising salaries make human resources one of 
the most difficult to control. Bauman (2005) found personnel costs as a percentage of 
total assets to be five times more than the global average. The costs faced by MFIs can 
16 
 
generally be classified as costs relating to the provision of financial services (direct costs) 
and non-financial service costs (indirect costs).  
The Micro Banking Bulletin (1998) cited in Morduch (1999) conducted a comprehensive 
survey that indicated that only MFIs that serve the poorest of the poor could only cover 
70% of their total costs. As a result MFIs that aim for greater outreach require donors, or 
in certain instances government to subsidize their costs (Khawari, 2004). 
2.3.6. Repayment Rates 
 
Microfinance’s strong appeal is due in part to the recorded high payment rates 
(D’espallier et al., 2011). Superficially it would be logical to assume that if MFI 
sustainability depends on cost reduction and income generation, high repayment rates 
should make this goal easy to achieve. However, several MFIs fail to be sustainable for 
various reasons, one of them being the inability to generate sufficient income to cover 
costs. Therefore, this suggests that a high payment rate can be inhibited by other factors. 
Nawai and Shariff’s (2012) study of factors that affect the repayment performance of 
microcredit programs in Malaysia found 10 factors. Amongst the ten factors was religious 
education, which would probably be specific to religious countries and not generalizable.  
Al Azzam et al. (2012) also found religious background to be a strong determining factor 
in repayment rates in Jordan.  However, factors such as age, gender, business experience, 
total household income, distance to the lender offices, period of loan approval and loan 
monitoring (Nawai and Shariff, 2012) can be generalized.   
The more prominent factor in repayment ability in microfinance globally has been gender. 
The literature presents a widely held view that women are generally less of a credit risk 
than men (Sagamba et al, 2013; D’espallier et al., 2011; Sharma and Zeller, 1997). It is 
evident that MFIs prefer female clients as illustrated by the famous Grameen Bank.  The 
founder of the new wave of microfinance, Mohamed Yunus started the Grameen Bank by 
issuing small loans to women in rural Bangladesh (Bateman and Chang, 2012). Many MFIs 
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are encouraged to target women in anticipation of high repayment rates (D’ espalier et 
al, 2011).  
D’espallier et al. (2011) investigated this widely held belief by using a global data set of 
350 MFIs in 70 countries. The study confirmed the belief by indicating that a higher 
percentage of female clients is associated with lower portfolio risk. The study further 
revealed that NGOs, individual-based and regulated MFIs benefit more from focusing on 
women. Implicit in D’espallier et al. (2011) study is the fact that MFIs follow prudential 
banking principles despite the higher rate of information asymmetry and lack of 
collateralization.   
One of the more prominent microfinance innovations is the provision of loans on group 
basis (Baland et al., 2013; Kodongo and Kendi, 2013). This method of group-lending is 
meant to reduce the information asymmetry by transferring the responsibility of 
screening clients onto the other members in the group.  The premise is that individuals in 
a group within a certain society are likely to know the credit worthiness of other potential 
members. Therefore, risk screening that can be more difficult to do, is done more 
efficiently by group members. There is no strong empirical evidence regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of group lending versus individual lending in terms of 
repayment rates (Sharma and Zeller, 1997). Sharma and Zeller (1997; 1734) argue that 
this lending method might also contribute to higher default rate for the following reasons:  
 when loans are received on  the basis of joint liability, members might choose to 
finance a riskier project due to the shared risk; 
 there is no clear way of selecting an ideal group size. If the group size is too big it 
poses communication and coordination problems. As a result the information 
gathering and group monitoring advantages are reduced; 
 there are also disincentives attached to reneging on contracts, as each member 
expects that the effect of their action on other members is diluted.  
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Besides the group lending methodology as a way of ensuring payment, loan officers are 
also tasked with ensuring that clients make the repayments. They form an integral part 
of many MFIs, particularly MFIs with remote clients. Loan officers are the link between 
clients and the institution. Loan officers meet with clients in the early phases of securing 
a loan and once the loan is issued, they may in some cases collect the repayments from 
the client’s villages/towns (Dixon et al., 2007; Sagamba et al., 2013).  
2.4. Conclusion 
 
The debate regarding the trade-off between institutional sustainability and outreach to 
the poor still continues. The results of some studies conducted do not support the 
“institutionist” view although there is some level of agreement that subsidies do not 
create better institutions.  MFIs face a number of challenges in an attempt to achieve 
sustainability. When MFIs move towards sustainability, they raise the cost of borrowing 
and therefor exclude the very poor from accessing microfinance. Loan officers are under 
pressure to increase repayment rates and this affects their productivity. Group lending 
promises to reduce the information asymmetry that plagues microfinance. However, 










CHAPTER 3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Introduction  
 
This chapter details the study’s research methodology. Section 3.2 details the research 
design.  Section 3.4. discusses the sampling and case study selection. Section 3.5 discusses 
methods used to measure sustainability and assess governance. Section 3.6 discusses the 
research design validity.   
3.2.  Research Design  
 
The study conducted an in-depth analysis in order to fully describe the sustainability of 
MFIs. In order to achieve this, the study not only assessed the financial performance of 
MFIs, it also assessed the reasons why some MFIs achieve sustainability while others do 
not. Since the study sought to answer a “how” and “why” type of question a descriptive 
qualitative research approach was adopted (Kumar, 2012). Therefore, the study adopted 
a multiple case study research approach using two South African MFIs as cases. Case study 
research is characteristically guided by theoretical framework in the data collection and 
generalization of the results (Yin, 2009). As a result, the research design was guided by 
microfinance theory which is based on empirical research that has emerged from 
microfinance literature. 
 
The MFIs’ financial statements were used to extract information on financial performance 
and sustainability. Firstly, the research established the sustainability of MFIs by using 
financial performance indicators that are prescribed by the literature. Secondly, a 
questionnaire was administered to the management of the case study MFIs. Thereafter, 
the results of the questionnaire and the literature were used to explain the results of the 
financial performance and sustainability analysis. Lastly the questionnaire results were 
used to assess the MFIs’ corporate governance.  
A quantitative methodology was not chosen for this study because it would only serve to 
answer the main research question: are South African MFIs sustainable? It would not 
explain the reasons why some institutions achieve sustainability while others do not. It 
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would also not allow for the assessment of the MFIs’ corporate governance, which is 
mainly qualitative.  
3.3.1.  Theoretical Framework  
 
The predominant theory states that microfinance institutions that rely on subsidies and 
not income from operations tend to be less financially sustainable (Morduch, 2000, 
Robinson, 1995; Hollis and Sweetman, 1996, Navajas et al. 1998; Woller and Dunford, 
199). Theory also states that when microfinance institutions are sustainable, this 
sustainability is achieved at the cost of reduced client outreach (Navajas et al. 1998; 
Morduch, 2000)  
Microfinance literature states that microfinance institutions are likely to be sustainable 
when: 
 There is low loan delinquency. 
 Low operating costs and high operational efficiency. 
 MFIs provide appropriate products that suit the clientele.  
 MFIs set interest rates that are not too high but high enough to cover all operating 
costs. 
 Management has a strong governance and presence of a board of directors. 
 The MFI has a long term strategic vision.  
Conversely, microfinance literature states that microfinance institutions are likely to be 
unsustainable when: 
 There is high loan delinquency. 
 High operating costs. 
 Mismatch between product provision and clientele requirements. 
 The absence of a board of directors and poor governance. 
 The MFI does not have a long term vision and clients are aware of this.  
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3.4. Sampling  
 
Case study research does not follow the same sampling logic as other methods of 
research. This is due to the fact that case study research does not aim to make statistical 
inferences about a population. Case studies aim to make analytical generalization as 
opposed to statistical generalization. As a result, units to be investigated are not randomly 
sampled from a population. In case study research, the selection of the “case” is based 
on the representation of the case. In other words, a case can be selected because it 
represents a critical test of existing theory. The case may also be selected because it is a 
rare or unique circumstance.  A case may also represent a typical case, revelatory or 
longitudinal (Yin, 2009).  
The above criteria are significant considerations for selecting single and multiple case 
studies.  However, for multiple case studies, another consideration in the design is given. 
The design follows replication logic as opposed to sampling logic.  Replication logic is 
analogous to the logic used in multiple experiments (Yin, 2009; 54). Therefore, each case 
is selected so that it either predicts similar results (literal replication) or predicts 
contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons; theoretical replication (Yin, 2009).  
The rationale for this selection was driven by the theoretical framework cited in the 
literature review and stated above.  
3.4.2  Case selection and Exclusions 
 
The selection of the case units was based on their age, mission statement, the presence 
of a board of directors and corporate governance.  The selected cases have the same 
mission statement: provision of finance to the poor. One institution provides financing 
for entrepreneurial females in the rural area of Mpumalanga. The other microfinance 
institution provides financing for entrepreneurial females in the rural area of Limpopo. 
The two MFIs are similar in mission statement, corporate governance and clientele. Most 
importantly, both microfinance institutions aim to increase their clientele. The two 
microfinance institutions are considered typical microfinance institutions because of their 
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practices, clientele and mission statement. This is in line with the literature definition of 
a microfinance institution.  
The following institution types were not considered in the selection of cases. Although 
they fall under the definition of MFIs, they are not the most common form of MFI in South 
Africa whereas NGOs are the most common form of MFI in most countries (Ledgerwood, 
1999):   
 Credit unions 
 Savings banks and postal savings banks 
 Loan cooperatives 
 Government SMME finance institutions 
3.5. Measures 
 
The section below discusses the performance indicators used to measure sustainability. 
It also discusses the indicators used to assess the characteristics of good corporate 
governance.  
3.5.1.  Operational and Financial sustainability 
 
In order to measure the sustainability of microfinance institutions the study utilized the 
CGAP Technical Guide as recommended in the Good Practice Guidelines for Funders of 
Microfinance (CGAP 2009). The guide is a tool used by funding agencies that design or 
monitor projects; and agencies that finance MFIs or community-managed loan funds.  A 
number of studies on microfinance institution sustainability have used this guideline in 
their analysis of microfinance performance (Mustafa & Saat, 2012).  The assessment of 
MFI performance focused on outreach, collection performance, financial sustainability 





The following parameters were used to measure the financial performance of MFIs: 
1. Outreach – this indicator measures the number of active clients and the level of 
poor clients reached. The number of active clients includes borrowers, depositors, 
and other clients who are currently accessing any financial services.   
 
2. Portfolio quality – this indicator measures the MFI’s ability to collect loans. The 
collection of loans is critical to the MFI’s success. It is also a proxy for the MFI’s 
general management competence. This indicator is considered one of the more 
revealing indicators because well performing MFIs seldom have bad management 
and vice versa. For this indicator the Portfolio at Risk (PAR) ratio and Write-off 
Ratio will be utilized.  
 
a. Portfolio at Risk for loans outstanding for more than 30 days is the most 
widely accepted measure of portfolio quality. It shows the portion of the 
portfolio that is “contaminated” by arrears and therefore at risk of not 
being repaid. The older the delinquency, the less likely that the loan will be 
repaid. High delinquency makes financial sustainability unachievable for 
an institution (Isern et al., 2007). Generally speaking, any Portfolio at Risk 
exceeding 10% should be a cause for concern, because unlike commercial 
loans, most micro loans are not backed by bankable collateral (Microrate, 
2003:6; Rosenberg, 2009).   
PAR =   Outstanding balance of loans with payments past due 
Portfolio outstanding (including amounts past due) 
b. Write-off Ratio represents the loans that the institution has removed from 
its books because of a substantial doubt that they will be recovered. The 
writing off of a loan is an accounting transaction to prevent assets from 
being unrealistically inflated by loans that may not be recovered. The 
writing off of a loan affects the gross loan portfolio and loan loss reserves 
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equally. Unless provision reserves are inadequate, the transaction will not 
affect total assets, net loan portfolio, expenses or net income. Write-offs 
have no bearing on collection efforts or on the client’s obligation to repay 
(Microrate, 2003: 13; Rosenberg, 2009). 
                         Write-off Ratio   =      Value of loans written off during period             
       Average gross loan portfolio during period 
3. Financial Sustainability and Profitability – this indicator measures the MFIs 
ability to maintain and expand the financial services they offer while covering all 
their costs and generating net income. 
o For subsidized MFIs: Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS), Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Adjusted Return on Equity (AROE) will be used: 
                           ROA =    After-tax profits during period 
               Starting (or period-average) assets 
 
OSS =           Operating Income during period 
Operating expenses + financing costs + provision 
for    loan losses during period   
 
o For non-subsidized: Return on Equity (ROE) will be used. 
             ROE =            After-tax profits during period 
                                   Starting (or period-average) equity during period 
 
4. Efficiency- this indicator measures how much an MFI earns on loans versus how 
much it spends to make them and monitor them. This is one of the most important 
indicators because the high cost of issuing loans is what characterizes 




a. Cost per client indicates how much it costs the retail financial service 
provider to serve each client. Because it does not penalize smaller loans, 
cost per client is a better efficiency ratio for comparing institutions. The 5 
year trend analysis for MFI B was inflation adjusted using historical CPI data 
and 2011 as the base year.  
Cost per client (or loan) =     Personnel and administrative expense 
Period-average number of active client or loans 
b. Operating Expense Ratio is the most widely used indicator of efficiency. It 
allows for a comparison between an MFI’s portfolio yield with its personnel 
and administrative expenses. This is how much an MFI earns on loans 
versus how much it spends to make and monitor them. However, it has the 
effect of making an MFI that issues small loans look worse than an MFI that 
issues large loans, even if both are efficiently managed.  
Operating expense ratio (OER) =  Personnel and administrative expense   
                                     Period-average gross loan portfolio 
3.5.2. Governance 
 
Although the literature on microfinance institutional governance is relatively new and 
scant, there are studies that highlight the factors that make up good governance (Pistelli 
et al, 2012; Lapenu and Pierret, 2006). 
This study adopted the guidelines and findings of Pistelli et al., (2012) pilot project on the 
measurement of governance in microfinance. The aims of Pistelli et al., (2012) study was 
to enhance the understanding of MFI Board structure, policies and activities. A few 
studies on governance in microfinance exist (Mersland and Strom, 2007; Hartarska, 2004; 
Rock et al., 1998; Hartaska and Mersland, 2012). However, none of them aimed to 
develop benchmark indicators.   The findings of Pistelli et al., (2012) study were used as a 
benchmark because it is the first and only study to develop indicators and benchmarks 
for microfinance governance.  Pistelli et al., (2012) study tested a new set of governance 
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indicators in 2011 among a sample of 162 MFIs across 57 countries. These indicators were 
selected by the Institutional Governance Working Group of the World Microfinance 
Forum of Geneva (Pistelli et al, 2012).  The measurement of governance focused on the 
following areas: 
1. Board Structure and Characteristics  
A good Board should encompass a range of expertise and experience as well as 
represent key stakeholders and maintain a significant degree of independence. The 
indicators are; number of Board members and number of independent Board 
members (Pistelli et al., 2012:12). 
2. Board Activity and Engagement  
To assess Board activity and commitment towards an MFI, questions regarding 
meeting frequency and attendance were asked. To evaluate Board effectiveness in 
developing policies addressing key business drivers, MFIs were asked which Board 
policies had changed within the last 3 years. The indicators are frequency of Board 
meetings, Board meeting attendance and, Board policy changes (Pistelli et al., 
2012:13) 
3. Risk Management 
As an organization increases in complexity, separating the CEO function from the 
Chairman function serves to reduce negative effects of power concentration and the 
risks associated with losing a key person (“key person risk”). A widely accepted 
factor of good risk management is establishing an independent risk management 
and internal audit function. The indicators are; separation of Chairman and CEO, 




3.6. Data Collection and analysis 
 
Case study research relies on multiple sources of evidence with the convergence of data 
(Yin, 2009; 18). In case study research, data collection and analysis are guided by 
theoretical propositions.  
3.6.1 Data Collection 
 
The data collection consisted of two steps. Firstly, financial statements was collected from 
the selected case study units. Due to the sensitivity of the information contained in the 
financial documents, one MFI requested that it not be directly mentioned by name in the 
study. Therefore neither MFIs are mentioned by name in the study. They are referred to 
as MFI A and MFI B. 
The MFIs were requested to provide a minimum of 3 years annual financial statements. 
MFI B provided 5 years’ worth of financial statements for analysis while MFI A only 
provided two years’ worth of financials. For that reason, the inter case comparisons will 
be made on the two years (2010 and 2011) of data that both MFIs have provided.  Since 
only MFI B provided 5 years annual financial statements, a comprehensive trend analysis 
of the MFI’s performance was conducted to investigate whether or not the MFI is moving 
towards or away from sustainability.  
Secondly, a structured questionnaire was used to collect data relating to governance 
performance and insight into managerial practices. The MFI executives were the only 
recipients of the questionnaire because they have control over the institutions 
governance. The questionnaire contained both open-ended and closed ended questions. 
The closed ended questions collected data relating to the institutions operational 
practices, human resource management and management policy. The open-ended 
questions collected data relating to the performance measures.  
An Adobe PDF and MS Word document was sent to the executives. This was to allow the 
respondents the option of completing the questionnaire electronically on the MS Word 
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document. Respondents then emailed the complete MS Word document to the 
researcher.  
Self-administered questionnaires have the advantage of reducing interviewer bias, being 
convenient and more likely to encourage truthful responses due to lack of pressure and 
intrusion. Conversely, their method of administration makes the response time slow and 
response rate low. For this reason, the respondents were given 4 weeks to complete the 
questionnaire. 
3.6.2. Data analysis  
 
The sustainability data collected was calculated into ratios using the guidelines set in the 
CGAP Technical Guide (2009).  The financial statements were adjusted for inflation and 
implicit and explicit subsidies such as access to funds on a grant or soft loan basis. This 
subsidy adjustment is prescribed in the in literature (Ledgerwood, 1999; CGAP 2003). 
Adjusting the financial statements allowed for a more meaningful comparison of 
performance among MFIs with differing amounts of subsidies. 
The Micro Banking Bulletin Sub-Saharan Africa Microfinance Analysis and Benchmarking 
Report 2010 was used to compare the performance of the case study MFIs to those of the 
continental MFIs. There was no publication of the benchmarks data post 2010.  
The Micro Banking Bulletin is a benchmarking source for the microfinance industry. The 
benchmarks focused on the following peer groups for these specified reasons:  
 Southern African MFIs – Country factors such as poverty levels, economic 
environment and population densities are heterogeneous. However, due to 
geographical and SADC membership, the Southern African countries are more 
likely to have more similarities than Eastern, Central or Western African countries.  
 NGO Entities – MFI A and MFI B are both registered as Non Profit Organizations.  
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 Young, New and Mature MFIs – This is to account for the age differences of the 
two cases and attempt to increase the similarities of the benchmark panel MFIs 
and the cases.    
The questionnaire collected ordinal, nominal and scale data. The data was captured using 
SPSS Statistical software. SPSS is a data management and analysis tool which is commonly 
used in Social Science research (www.uwindsor.ca). The software allowed for the input of 
data and comprehensive analysis of data by generating tabulated reports, charts and 
descriptive statistics.   
The analysis was interpreted by using the theoretical framework on causes of inefficiency, 
governance issues and institutional capacity matters. As a result, the questionnaire data 
was interpreted in reference to the performance ratio by looking for patterns described 
in the theoretical framework.  
3.7. Criticism of Case Study 
 
Case studies are commonly criticized for the lack of rigor and too much reliance on the 
researcher as a data collection tool. Other research methods are considered to be more 
rigorous due to the existence of numerous methodological texts which provide 
researchers with specific procedures to be followed (Yin 2009).  
The second and most important criticism is the inability to make scientific generalizations 
from case studies (Yin, 2009). However, Yin (2009) argues that case studies make 
generalizations on theories as opposed to statistical generalizations after analyzing a 
sample. In cognizance of this criticism, this research followed the following validity 
procedures to ensure rigor in the study and consistency in data collection and analysis. 
 Construct Validity: In order to gain further insight into the phenomenon.  The use 
of multiple sources of evidence assisted in establishing a chain of evidence. After 
the data was collected, follow up questions were conducted in order to 
corroborate the data collected from financial statements and questionnaire. 
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 Internal Validity: Internal validity was addressed through pattern matching. The 
theoretical framework that guided the data collection had put forward 
observations that were likely to occur. The case study design phase addressed the 
existing theories and potential rival theories. The study observed the patterns 
which are consistent with the theoretical framework and also identified 
inconsistencies. Since two cases have been selected in the case study, the 
researcher focused on how and why certain operations were observed in one case 
and not the other. The study also linked the analysis of the theory reviewed in the 
literature to the data collected.  
 External Validity: The use of two cases allowed for inter case comparisons and 
made analytical generalizations through replication logic. Specifically, the two 
cases have been selected because they possessed different theoretical conditions. 
The study expected different results from the cases but for predictable reasons. If 
the results of the data analysis were different as predicted, theoretical replication 
would be claimed.  
 Reliability: In order to achieve reliability, a case study protocol was used in the 
data collection phase. Case study protocol is a set of questions that the researcher 
uses to guide the data collection.  A log of the financial statements collected was 
kept in order to ensure consistency in data collection. The questionnaire had the 
same questions for both cases and equal time was allowed for responses. After 
data collection, follow up questions were conducted to ensure construct validity.  
3.8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter detailed the design and methods of the study. It also described the data 
collected. The quantitative data was analyzed using GCAP prescribed accounting ratio. 
The results of the ratios were benchmarked against other African and international MFIs 
using the MicroBanking Bulletin. The questionnaire data was analyzed using SPSS 
software and theoretical framework. The chapter also discussed the choice of cases and 
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justified the use and selection of the case units. Case study criticism was highlighted and 












 CHAPTER 4  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1.  Introduction  
 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the financial statement analysis and 
the responses of the surveyed institutions. Section 4.2 begins with an analysis of 
operational self-sufficiency and profitability, portfolio quality, outreach and efficiency in 
order to determine sustainability. The MFIs are compared to the benchmarks and 
amongst each other in order to identify variations and similarities. Thereafter, Section 4.3 
analyses the governance of the MFIs using the survey responses. Section 4.4 provides a 
summary of findings and section 4.5 concludes.   
4.2. Sustainability Analysis 
 
4.2.1.  Operational Self-Sufficiency and Profitability  
 
Figure 1 indicates that MFI A and B did not achieve an operational self-sufficiency of a 
100% or more. Therefore both MFIs are not operationally self-sufficient. MFI A’s 
operational self-sufficiency ratio increased by 15% between 2010 and 2011 while MFI B’s 
increased by only 6%. The benchmark comparison indicates that both MFIs 
underperformed NGO, Young, Mature and Southern MFIs on a regional comparison.  
The disparity in the performance is partly influenced by the age difference. The average 
age of the NGO MFIs in the benchmark data set is ten years. MFI A is 5 years old. MFI A’s 
operational self-sufficiency is closer in comparison to New (3 years old) than Young MFIs 
(7 years old). MFI B is twenty one years old. It outperforms New MFIs but fails to 
outperform Young MFIs even though it is fourteen years older.  This indicates the level of 
South African MFIs inability to generate sufficient revenue to expenses or to keep 






Figure 1: Operational Self-Sufficiency  
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statements 
Operational self-sufficiency is directly affected by the factors discussed below. The first 
factor is an institution’s ability to generate income by pricing its interest rates correctly 
and efficiently collecting fees (Conning, 1999; Robinson 1996). MFI A and MFI B collect 
interest income and services fees. In the case of MFI A, the interest received and services 
fees are only 51% of total operating expenses. In a self-sufficient institution, interest 
received and service fees should be more than expenses. At the very least, interest and 
service fees should be equal to the expenses. The latter applies to MFI B, where the 
revenue from interest and fees is 97% of total operating expenses.  
The second factor is an MFI’s ability to effectively collect loan repayments, thus 
maintaining a strong portfolio quality. The ability to collect payments reduces the loan 
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The third factor is an MFI’s ability to effectively manage its operating expenses. MFI A 
exhibited a higher cost per loan and operating expense ratio than MFI B.  
4.2.1.1. Adjusted Return on Assets  
Figure 2 indicates that MFI A and B did not achieve a positive return on assets. This means 
that MFI A and B are unable to yield a positive income after inflation and subsidy 
adjustments. Furthermore, when the MFIs’ liabilities are treated as if they were at market 
costs, the operating income is not sufficient to absorb that adjustment. Therefore both 
MFIs are not profitable. MFI A’s negative return on assets decreased from -30% in 2010 
to -24% in 2011 while MFI B’s decreased by a marginal 0.5%.  The benchmark comparison 
indicates that both MFIs underperformed NGO, Young, New and Southern MFIs on a 
regional basis.  
Although both MFIs achieved a negative return on assets, Figure 2 indicates that MFI B 
performed better than MFI A. According to Mersland and Strom (2007) the return on 
assets is directly affected by average loan size disbursed.   MFI A’s average loan size is 
approximately R1800 while MFI B’s is R2300. A higher average loan improves the return 











Figure 2: Adjusted Return on Assets  
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statements 
 
A five year review of MFI B’s operating self-sufficiency in Figure 3 indicates that MFI B 
experienced an operational self-sufficiency of 96% for 2007 and 2008. In 2009 it sharply 
decreased to 86% and only increased by 2% in 2010. The ratio then increased by 6% in 
2011. The data indicates volatility in the MFI B’s revenue and subsidies.  In the 5 year 
period, the MFI did not achieve a 100% ratio on operational self-sufficiency. In 2009, MFI 
B experienced an after tax adjusted profit but the financial expense, loan-loss provision 
expense, and operating expenses were high.  This resulted in the sharp decline in 
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Figure 3: Operational Self-Sufficiency Trend Analysis  
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statements 
In the absence of grants, an MFI that does not reach sustainability will eventually decrease 
its loan fund capital as operating expenses increase more than the revenue. As a result 
the MFI will have a smaller pool of funds to loan to borrowers, thus reducing its ability to 
serve the poor.  
4.2.2. Portfolio Quality 
 
As mentioned, this indicator measures the MFI’s ability to collect loans and maintain a 
portfolio that is unlikely to be lost due to unpaid loans.   
4.2.2.1. Portfolio at Risk  
 
Figure 4 indicates that MFI A had a portfolio at risk of 17%. This is approximately four 
times higher than the NGO and Southern MFIs benchmark. This means that 17% of the 
portfolio was at risk of not being repaid.  MFI A indicated that on average 61-80% of their 
clients return for loans. The remaining 20-40% possibly do not return due to previous 
failure to pay. Even the Young and New benchmarks in Africa exhibited a lower portfolio 
at risk than MFI A. Younger MFIs are expected to have higher portfolio at risk because 
they have not built a strong database of low loan risk clients. The longer an MFI trades 
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loans can significantly diminish the portfolio’s income generating ability. High portfolio at 
risk and write-off ratio reduce the MFI’s assets on the balance sheet and hence it’s ROA.  
As Figure 4 indicates MFI B had an extremely low portfolio at risk when compared to other 
MFIs in the benchmark. The reason for this glaring difference in the benchmark 
performance can only be speculative in the absence of empirical study on African MFI 
loan portfolio quality.  
Figure 4: Portfolio at Risk  
 
 Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statements 
An investigation into MFI B’s low portfolio at risk reveals that it has been consistently low 
at an average of 0.24% for the five years under review as indicated in Figure 5. The survey 
results revealed that MFI B’s main clientele is female and it uses group lending method to 
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lending method. Furthermore, its loan officer meet with clients twice a month in order to 
address payment challenges that they may be facing. However, MFI B did not reveal the 
specific actions taken to address these challenges. MFI B also stated that “clients have so 
much respect for MFI B as an institution that they do not want to disappoint us, so they 
prioritise repaying us to maintain a good relationship.” The literature suggests that clients 
are mainly motivated to pay their loans promptly when they have confidence that the 
MFI will continue to provide loans. 
As stated in the literature, strong portfolio quality in microfinance is driven by gender and 
a group lending methodology.  Another likely reason is the high retention rate. When 
asked about the retention rate, MFI B stated a rate of 80%-100%.  If 80-100% of the clients 
return for loans then the risk of lending to risky clients is reduced because the MFI already 
knows the client’s profile. It is therefore in a good position to filter out potentially bad 
clients thus reducing the risk of default.  
Figure 5: Portfolio at Risk Trend Analysis 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statements 
4.2.2.2. Write off- Ratio 
This ratio represents the percentage of an MFI’s loans that have been removed from the 
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may indicate a problem in the MFI’s collection efforts. However, write-off policies vary, 
and that makes comparisons among MFIs difficult.  
When compared to the NGO, New and Young MFIs in Figure 6 MFI A has a higher write-
off ratio. As it is with the portfolio at risk, new and young MFIs are expected to have a 
higher write-off ratio than older MFIs. It is therefore not uncommon for MFI A to have a 
high write off ratio. However, at 6% and 7% it is exceptionally higher than the benchmark.  
As it was with the portfolio at risk, MFI B’s write-off ratio is significantly lower than the 
benchmark.  
Figure 6: Write-Off Ratio  
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An investigation into MFI B’s lower write-off ratio revealed that the ratio remained below 
1% over the 5 year period under review as Figure 7 indicates.  
Figure 7: Write-off Ratio Trend Analysis 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statements 
A comparison of the two MFIs indicates that MFI A had a higher loan delinquency than 
MFI B. Both MFIs use group lending method to administer loans. This might be the main 
reason for the strong portfolio quality for MFI B and also the reason for a poor portfolio 
quality for MFI A. The use of group lending methodology to issue loans provides a 
screening and peer pressure mechanism which inherently reduce the payment risk. 
However, this same methodology can create wild-fire delinquency as clients watch their 




4.2.3..1. Cost per Client 
 
Figure 8 indicates that the cost per client for MFI A was extremely higher than all MFIs in 
the benchmark. Compared to the NGO cost per client of 78, MFI A was 381. MFI A cited 
South Africa’s high cost of labour and low population densities in the MFI’s primary 
market as the main contributor to these high costs. When compared to other regions, 
MFI A had high cost per client while MFI B’s was lower than the benchmark. MFI B also 
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Figure 8: Cost per Client Benchmark (Dollar Value) 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statements 
A five year analysis of MFI B’s cost per client in Figure 9 indicates that it was low in 2008 
and then it increased by 50% in 2009 and 2010. Although the ratio decreased in 2011, it 
did not decrease to its lowest level of 27. In 2008 when the ratio was at its lowest, the 
number of clients had increased by 22% from the previous year. From 2009 to 2011, the 
number of clients increased by a steady average of 14% yet during that period the ratio 
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Figure 9: Cost per Client Trend Analysis 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statements 
4.2.3.2.  Operating Expense Ratio 
 
Figure 10 indicates that, MFI A’s operating expense ratio was 99% in 2010 and 76% in 
2011. This ratio was significantly higher than the NGO (38%), New (59%) and Young (42%) 
benchmark. Younger MFIs commonly have high operating expense ratios. MFI B’s ratio 
was 36% in 2010 and 32% in 2011. In both years, the ratio was below the NGO benchmark 
of 38%. Although MFI B is six years older than the average age of the Mature benchmark, 
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Figure 10: Operating Expense Ratio  
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statements  
A comparison of MFI A and B in Figure 1 indicates that MFI B had lower operating expense 
ratio. A reason for this disparity is that older MFIs tend to have lower operating expense 
ratio (Gonzales, 2007). Therefore, MFI B is expected to have a much lower operating 
expense ratio because it is fifteen years older than MFI A. One explanation for this 
efficiency is that subsidies have a positive impact on efficiency. However, after a certain 
threshold subsidies tend to make the institution less efficient (Hudon and Traca, 2011). 
Furthermore, MFIs that serve more than 2000 clients tend to have a lower operating 
expense ratio than MFIs that serve a smaller client base. MFI A has 1079 clients while MFI 
B has 87293. However, after 5000 clients, the operating expense ratio ceases to be lower 



















As the literature suggests, MFI B’s operating expense ratio should be almost constant or 
declining at a slow rate but that has not been the case as Figure 25 below indicates.  Figure 
11 shows that MFI B’s operating expense ratio increased over a period of 4 years and only 
decreased in 2011.  
Figure 11: Operating Expense Ratio Trend Analysis 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statement 
4.2.4. Outreach 
 
4.2.4.1. Breath of outreach  
 
As mention above this indicator measures the number of active clients. The number of 
active clients includes borrowers, depositors, and other clients who are currently 
accessing any financial services.   
Figure 12 indicates that MFI A did not reach as many clients as MFI B and the benchmark. 
MFI A had 1079 active clients while the NGO and New MFI benchmark had 11067 and 
5160 respectively. As mentioned group lending is considered to reach poorer clients than 
individual lending. However, even with group lending methodology, MFI A has not 
managed to reach as many clients as the benchmark.  MFI B outperformed all MFIs in the 
benchmark at 87273 active clients. Factors such as portfolio size, population density and 
lending methodology affect client outreach. These factors vary from MFI to MFI. Although 
the number of clients is the widely used proxy for measuring breadth of outreach, it skews 
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Figure 12: Breadth of Outreach 
 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financials Statements 
Breadth of outreach has to be viewed in conjunction with depth of outreach because 
there is often a trade-off between the two (Cull et al, 2000; Morduch, 2000; Navajas et 
al., 1998).   
4.2.4.2.  Depth of Outreach  
 
Depth of outreach measures the ability to reach the poorest of the poor who are excluded 
from formal financial services. As Figure 13 indicates, in terms of servicing the poorest of 
the poor, MFI A performed better than other benchmark NGOs, New, Young MFIs and 
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Figure 13: Depth of Outreach 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange 2010 and MFI Financial Statements 
Although MFI B had the highest breadth, it had a lower depth of outreach than MFI A, 
New, Young and the Southern benchmark. However, it performs on par with NGO MFIs. 
This observation suggests that there is a trade-off between MFI B’s ability to reach the 
poorest of the poor and reaching less poor clients. Figure 14 presents MFI B’s outreach 
growth pattern over 5 years. It indicates that MFI B increased its level of depth by an 
average of 8% per annum between 2007 and 2011. In contrast, the breadth of outreach 
increased by 16% per annum on average during the same period. It is evident that it 
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Figure 14: Number of board members 
Source: MFI Financial Statements 
4.3. Governance 
 
4.3.1.  Board Structure and Characteristics  
 
This indicator aims to gather information on typical Board sizes in MFIs and to test 
whether better-performing institutions are characterized by a certain Board size. 
Mersland and Strom (2007) conducted a study that found that managerial efficiency 
increases with boards that have up to 9 members and less. MFI A between has 7 and 9 
board members, while MFI B has more than 10 board members. As Figure 14 indicates, 




















Figure 15: Number of board members 
Source: MFI Survey Results and Micro Banking Bulletin 2012 
On a board independence level, 63% of MFI A’s board members are independent as 
indicated in Figure 16. The benchmark median is 67%. This means that MFI A’s board is 
marginally less independent that the microfinances surveyed in 57 countries around the 
world. MFI B’s board is 6% above the international level of independence. 
Figure 16: Board Independence 
Source: MFI Survey Results and Micro Banking Bulletin 2012 
4.3.2. Board Activity and Engagement 
 
To assess Board activity and commitment towards an MFI, MFIs were asked how 
frequently board meetings are held and what changes in board policy had taken place in 
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Figure 17: Frequency of Board Meetings 
Source: MFI: Survey Results and Micro Banking Bulletin 2012 
Of the MFI’s surveyed, 80% indicated that their board meets less than 10 times a year 
while only 20% meet more than 10 times a year. MFI A and MFI B’s boards meet less than 
10 times a year. Since the international norm is less than 10 times a year, MFI A and B are 
on par with the international norm as Figure 17 indicates.  
The MFIs were asked what Board policies had changed within the last 3 years. This 
evaluates Board effectiveness in developing policies and addressing key business drivers.  
MFI A and B were asked whether the board had policy changes regarding the following 
key sustainability issues: 
a) Increasing clientele/Increasing volume of loans 
b) Reducing clientele/Reducing volume of loans 
c) Profitability/Surplus of the instiution 
d) Staff efficiency  
e) Acquiring private capital for growth  
f) None of the above 
Both MFI A and B responded “none of the above.” With the exception of response “b”, 
this response implies that the salient factors of sustainability and outreach have not 
formed part of the institutions agenda in the past 3 years. It is possible that the MFIs did 
have sustianability on the agenda 4 or 5 years ago. When asked what agenda has taken 
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place. There was reluctance to reveal the board’s agenda on account of confidentiality. 
The issue of sustainability does not explicitly and actively dominate the MFI’s board 
agenda.  
4.3.3. Risk Management 
 
A widely accepted factor of good risk management is the establishment of an 
independent risk management and internal audit function. Furthermore, an organization 
needs to separate the CEO function from the Chairman function. This separation serves 
to reduce negative effects of power concentration and the risks associated with losing a 
key person (“key person risk”). It is important to keep in mind, however, that such 
separation may not be apparent in fast-growing MFIs (Pistelli et al, 2012). 
Figure 18 indicates that MFI A and B‘s case, the roles of chairman and CEO are served by 
separate individuals. Of the MFI’s in the benchmark sample, 80% indicated that the roles 
are separate. MFI A and B are on par with the majority of its international counterparts. 
A study conducted by Mesrland and Strom (2008) found that a joint CEO and Chairperson 
role reduces board efficiency. 
Figure 18: Role Separation 
Source: MFI: Survey Results and Micro Banking Bulletin 2012 
Similarly, collecting information on voting rights allows for the assessment of the extent 
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while MFI B grants funders no voting rights on its board committees. On the international 
benchmark, funders get more than 50% voting rights on board committees as indicated 
in Figure 19. 
Figure 19: Funder voting rights 
Source: MFI: Survey Results and Micro Banking Bulletin 2012 
Hartaska (2004) argues that boards with more donors with voting rights can lead to fewer 
borrowers and achieve lower levels of operating self-sufficiency. Hartaska (2004) alludes 
to the fact that donors tend to emphasize serving the poor hence diverting attention from 
sustainability. Furthermore, the ability of donor representatives to raise funds easier than 
the MFI acquiring a commercial loans, tends to lower incentives to achieve high levels of 
operating self-sufficiency. As the sustainability analysis indicated, MFI A and B have not 
achieved operational sustainability and financial profitability. However, MFI A achieved a 
higher depth of outreach than MFI B and the benchmark. One explanation might be a 
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Figure 20: Presence of Risk management and audit procedures 
Source: MFI: Survey Results and Micro Banking Bulletin 2012  
 
MFI A and B responded yes to having risk management and audit procedures. Of the 
benchmark MFIs, only 58% indicated that they have risk management procedures and 
77% responded yes to having audit procedures. As Figure 20 reflects, a majority of 
benchmark MFIs have risk management and audit procedures. MFI A and B are visibly on 
par with the international practices.   
4.6. CONCLUSION  
 
The primary purpose of this study was to find out: 
“Whether South African MFIs are institutionally sustainable?” 
The two cases were individually assessed using performance indicators that focused on 
profitability, operational self-sufficiency, portfolio quality, efficiency and outreach.  The 
financial ratios used to measure the profitability and self-sufficiency revealed that both 
MFIs are not profitable nor self-sufficient because they both did not achieve an 
operational self-sufficiency of 100 nor positive adjusted returns on assets. The MFIs 
expenses far outweighed the revenue they generated. Although MFI B was in a better 
financial position and is more likely to achieve self-sufficiency in the immediate future, 
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slowly weaning off the use of subsidies for portfolio growth. However, it still depends on 
donations to subsidize operations.  
As previously mentioned, the literature states that MFIs that move towards sustainability 
tend to do so at the expense of the depth of outreach. Furthermore, MFIs that are more 
subsidy dependent tend to serve the poor (depth) more than MFIs that are less subsidy 
dependent.  In the 5 years reviewed, MFI B’s profitability and self-sufficiency improved. 
However, its depth of outreach grew at a slower rate than its breadth of outreach. On the 
converse, MFI A which is more subsidy depended had a higher depth of outreach than 
MFI B and the benchmark 
When compared to the benchmark, MFI B exhibited higher portfolio quality and outreach. 
This indicates that it has a healthy loan portfolio that is not at risk of being lost to 
outstanding loan repayments. Due to its healthy and large loan portfolio, MFI B’s outreach 
has managed to outperform continental counterparts.  
When compared to the benchmark, MFI A exhibited below average portfolio quality and 
breadth of outreach. It’s portfolio at risk was significantly higher than the benchmark and 
MFI B. If the portfolio at risk is not controlled, MFI A could suffer a reduction in the 
portfolio size and income earned from lending operations.   
The African benchmark data indicates that over time, young MFIs such as MFI A improve 
their operational self-sufficiency and profitability, although not all of them achieve this.  
This implies that MFI A is likely to exhibit the results that MFI B exhibited when it matures, 
depending on how it manages its portfolio areas and expenses.   
The subsidiary objectives of the study are: 
1. To identify the constraints to operational and financial sustainability; 
The analysis of the performance indicators revealed personnel costs as MFI A and B’s most 
significant constraint. The operational efficiency and cost to client of MFI A was 
significantly higher than the benchmark. The survey responses corroborated this finding. 
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Respondents from both institutions cited high salaries as the biggest operating expense. 
MFI A argued that the salaries are due to the very high cost of reaching clients who reside 
in low density areas. It is likely that other rural based MFIs experience the same constraint 
since most rural areas are not as densely populated as urban areas. Therefore, the 
observed contributor to the high operating costs in MFI A can be generalized for rural 
MFIs in South Africa because the environment that they operate in is similar and the 
country’s labour laws apply.  MFI B argued that there is a mismatch between competitive 
salaries it has to pay and low income generated due to the loans sizes and high levels of 
poverty in the areas it serves.   
2. To ascertain whether or not MFIs in SA have sound corporate governance when 
compared to the benchmark 
The assessment of corporate governance revealed that both MFI A and B have sound 
governance structures when compared to the benchmark. Both MFIs are aware of the 
risks inherent in their operational activities and have risk and audit structures to manage 
it. The frequency of board meetings and attendance of board members indicated 
commitment towards the goals of the institution.  
With regards to the long term strategic vision of achieving sustainability, the issue of  
sustainability did not explicitly and actively dominate the MFIs board agenda. However, 
based on the responses on subsidy depedence and portfolio growth, both MFIs indicated 
an intention to wean off subisidies, generate sufficent income to sustain operations and 




CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Summary and Conclusion 
 
Microfinance institutions worldwide have a mission to provide finance to those with 
limited or no access to finance. In most countries the poor are excluded from the formal 
banking sector. Microfinance is characterized by small loans, uncollateralized lending and 
donor dependence. In order to continue serving the poor and realize the goal of serving 
the poorest of the poor, MFIs need to be profitable and self–sufficient. For South African 
MFIs, the move towards profitability and self-sufficiency is constrained by a low density 
clientele and high personnel costs. These constraints make sustainability for South African 
MFIs a target unlikely to be achieved in the immediate future.  
This chapter provides a summary of the previous chapters, the main results, and 
recommendations for future studies. 
The introduction chapter proposed the research question: are South African MFIs 
institutionally sustainable?  The literature review sought to contextualize the importance 
of sustainability in microfinance. In addition, the prevalent opposing views on the matter 
were reviewed and used to guide the theoretical framework of the study. The dominant 
“institutionist” view states that MFIs should be sustainable if their goal of providing access 
to the poor is to be realized. While the “welfarist” view agrees in part that MFIs should 
be sustainable, it fears that the drive for sustainability is at the cost of reduced access to 
the poorest of the poor. Therefore, the ideal situation would be where MFIs are 
sustainable while simultaneously reaching the poorest of the poor. A win-win situation. 
Furthermore, the literature review discussed some of the sustainability constraints and 
success factors highlighted in the literature.  
The research methodology chapter proposed the use of a multiple case study research 
approach. Two exemplary microfinance institutions were selected based on specific 
characteristics and availability of audited information. Primary data in the form of 
financial statements and surveys was successfully collected from both cases.  
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Chapter 4 analyzed the data and discussed the results. The analysis of the performance 
indicators showed that both MFIs are not profitable nor self-sufficient because they both 
did not achieve an operational self-sufficiency of 100% nor a positive AROA. They are 
therefore not sustainable.  The MFI’s expenses far outweighed the revenue they 
generated. Although MFI B is in a better financial position and it is more likely to achieve 
self-sufficiency in the immediate future, MFI A is not in such a position. The most 
prominent constraint in the sustainability of MFIs in South Africa is the high personnel 
costs. The benchmark of African MFIs do not incur half the personnel costs that South 
African MFIs do. The comparative analysis of MFI corporate governance revealed South 
African MFI’s corporate governance fairs well when compared to international MFI’s.  
5.2. Research Limitations 
 
The main limitation of this study has been data constraint and MFI willingness to 
participate in academic research. In the data collection phase, one of the MFIs were 
unable to provide data for the three years requested. Hence a review of the trend in 
certain performance indicators could not be conducted. During the data analysis phase, 
follow up questions to some survey responses could not be answered. One MFI cited 
confidentiality while the other did not respond. Therefore, certain yet minimal “why” 
questions could not be answered. In particular, the researcher could not find out why 
performance indicators such as portfolio at risk and write-off ratio for MFI A were 
remarkably higher than the benchmark.  As a result further insight into the constraints to 
the MFI sustainability could not be gained.  
5.3. Recommendations 
 
Based on the results of the analysis, the study recommends that South African MFIs 
should aim to manage their portfolios better. MFIs could start by identifying the factors 
that influence client delinquency. It might be that the group lending method is not 
efficiently screening clients. In some cases the clients might not be using the borrowed 
funds for productive purposes and thus failing to repay the loan. Due to the 
characteristically small size of the loans, MFIs should aim to increase their retention rates 
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because the cost of issuing loans to the same clients is lower than it is for new clients. 
Therefore MFIs should ensure that at least 70% of its loan portfolio consists of return 
clients, while 30% should be new clients.  
Since personnel costs are considerably high, MFIs should seek innovative ways to issue 
and collect loans. The use of technology such as cellphone banking can reduce the issue 
of remoteness and personnel costs. Some Kenyan MFIs are making use of cellphone 
banking to reach clients in remote rural areas. The use of cellphone banking can also 
increase the number of active clients. Increasing the number of clients will allow the 
younger and smaller MFIs to achieve economies of scale necessary to improve efficiency.  
 
5.4. Further Research 
 
The research on microfinance in Africa is growing, however, not a lot of empirical studies 
exist on South African microfinance in particular. Based on the findings of this study, the 
following areas are recommended for further study: 
 The causes of loan delinquency amongst South African MFIs.  
 The impact of the South African government’s labour regulations on microfinance 
cost efficiency. 
 What technology innovations can be introduced by MFIs to reach the poorest of 
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Questionnaire Cover Page 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
The Sustainability of Microfinance Institutions in South Africa 
 
My name is Teboho Lekatsa and I am a Masters student at UCT Graduate School of 
Business. I am undertaking a research project to describe the sustainability of 
microfinance institutions in South Africa for the purpose of the challenges they face and 
reviewing efficiency levels. Two exemplary NGO microfinance institutions have been 
selected for the study. This research is for ta thesis which is in partial completion of a 
Masters of Commerce in Development Finance.   
 
I therefore kindly ask that you complete the following questionnaire regarding the 
funding, productive efficiency, clientele profile, governance and management and 
incorporation of your institution.   
 
The following questionnaire will require approximately 30 minutes to complete. There is 
no compensation for responding nor is there any known risk. In order to ensure that all 
information will remain confidential, please do not include your name. Copies of the 
research will be provided to my Thesis Supervisor, Mr Barry Standish.   
 
The data collected will provide useful information regarding the challenges faced by 
microfinance institutions in South Africa. It will contribute towards the body of 
knowledge and hopefully positively influence policies that will encourage microfinance 
as a development tool in South Africa.  
 
If there are areas of discussion which you feel should be included in this study, please 
notify me on the contact details included below. Your suggestions will be highly 
appreciated.  
 
Please indicate if you would like a summary copy of this study.  If you require additional 
information or have questions, regarding the questionnaire or study, please contact me 
telephonically on 079 321 7257 or email me at Teboho.astakel04@gmail.com. You may 
also contact my supervisor, Mr Barry Standish with respect to this research, at 021 785 
4051. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to assist me in my academic endeavors. 
 





This questionnaire is designed to solicit information for purely academic purposes. All 
information provided will only be used for the Master of Commerce in Development 
Finance 2012, University of Cape Town, Graduate School of Business. The contents of 
this form are absolutely confidential. Information identifying the respondent will not 
be disclosed under any circumstance.   
 
 
Section A: Background Information  
1. Name of organization (coded 1 and 2 for anonymity) 
1         
2         
2. Year of Incorporation: 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
3. Type of Entity (Please choose 1): 
a) Private Company (PTY LTD )      
b) Section 21 Company (Nonprofit Company)    
c) Credit Union        
d) Loan Cooperative       
e) Other (Please specify 
:……………………………………………………………………………………………..) 
 
4. Number of employees: 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
5. Founding Mission Statement (Please select the statement that best reflects the 
founding mission statement): 
a) To alleviate poverty in rural areas with the main focus being social return 
as opposed to financial return.      
  
b) To alleviate poverty in rural areas with the main focus being financial 
return as opposed to social return.      
  
c) To alleviate poverty in rural areas with the main focus being financial 
return AND social return.       
  





6. Niche Clientele (Please select 1): 
a) Female        
b) Male         
c) Equally services male and female      
  
7. Initial/Starting sources of funding: 
a) National Government       
b) Local Donor        
c) International Donor       
d) Commercial Loans       
e) Equity (Shareholders or Funders)     
f) Other (Please 
Specify):……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Section B: Services, Retention Rates, Loan Delinquency  
8. Drop out and retention rates:  On average, how often do your clients return for 
repeat loans? 
a. 0-20%         
b. 21-40%         
c. 41-60%         
d. 61-80%         
e. 81-100%        
       
9. Taking deposits is an essential service that South African MFIs should provide: 
a. Agree         
b. Strongly Agree       
c. Neutral         
d. Disagree        
e. Strongly Disagree       
10. What is your main loan delivery method? 
a. Group Lending         
b. Individual Lending       
c. Equal          
 
 
Section B: Governance and Management  
11.   Board Structure and Characteristics 
a. Number of board members 
i. 1-3        
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ii. 4-6        
iii. 7-9        
iv. More than 10       
v. 0          
 
b. Number of independent Board Members  
i. 1-3        
ii. 4-6        
iii. 7-9        
iv. More than 10       
v. 0        
 
12. Board Activity and Engagement 
a) Frequency of Board Meetings (Per Year) 
i. 1-3        
ii. 4-6        
iii. 7-9        
iv. More than 10       
v. 0         
  
b) Board Meeting Attendance (Per meeting) 
i. 0-19%        
ii. 20-40%       
iii. 41-60%       
iv. 61-80%       
v. 81-100%       
a) In the past 3 years, did the Board change policies concerning: (You can 
select more than 1) 
i. Increasing clientele/Increasing volume of loans   
ii. Reducing clientele/Reducing volume of loans   
iii. Profitability/Surplus of the institution    
iv. Staff Efficiency       
v. Acquiring private capital for growth     
vi. None of the above       
13. Risk Management 
a. Separation of Chairman & CEO 
i. Yes        
ii. No        
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b. Funder Voting rights on committees 
i. More than 50%      
ii. Less than 50%       
iii. No voting rights      
c. Presence of risk management and audit procedures 
i. Yes        
ii. No        
          
Section C: Depth of Outreach and Future Plans 
14. Increasing our clientele by issuing more loans in the next 3 years is important for 
our organization.  
a. Strongly Agree       
b. Agree         
c. Neutral        
d. Disagree        
e. Strongly Disagree       
   
15. If Answered Agree or Strongly Agree in Q10 question above, where would you get 
additional funds to accommodate more loans? 
 Equity (Existing funds earned from operations)   
 Savings collected from clients     
 Donors        
 Commercial Loan       
 Government Concessionary loan (Soft Loan)    
  








Section D: Operational Efficiency 
17. What productivity constraints do you think apply to your institution? 
a. Rising staff costs without an equal rising in interest income generated 
   
72 
 
b. Increasing number of loans also increases loan delinquency in the same 
proportion 
c. No identified productivity constraints 
d. Other (Specify: ……………………………………………………………………………………) 
 
18. As a percentage of total expenses, which interval do you think salaries fall under?  
a) 10 – 25%         
  
b) 26 – 50%        
c) 51 – 75%        
d) 76 – 100%        
 
19. Staff productivity incentive schemes are essential to improve efficiency 
a. Strongly Agree       
b. Agree         
c. Neutral        
d. Disagree        
e. Strongly Disagree         
 
20. In the past 3 years how many employees (Loan officers and administration staff) 
have gone to for training courses? (As a proportion of total number of employees) 
a. 0%         
b. 1-25%         
c. 26-50%        
d. 51-75%        
e. 76-100%         
     
Section E: Financial Sustainability 
21. Besides interest income from loans disbursed to clients, do you have any sources 
of income? 
a. Yes         
b. No         
        
22. Is your institution dependent on any of the following for to meet monthly 
operational expenses: 
a. Subsidy /Donations/ Grants     
b. Commercial loan       
c. Concessional loans (at below-market rates)    
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d. Donations        
e. Revenue generated from operations (Profits)   
f. Other 
(Specify)…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
   
23. Being able to meet monthly operational expenses from income generated from 
issuing loans is a strong item on our board’s agenda.  
a. Strongly Agree       
b. Agree         
c. Neutral        
d. Disagree        
e. Strongly Disagree       
 
 








25. What would you say are the constraints to South African MFI’s generating enough 
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